§ 1.482-1. Allocation of income and deductions among taxpayers.

USP, a United States agricultural exporter, regularly buys transportation services from FSub, its foreign subsidiary, to ship its products from the United States to overseas markets. Although FSub occasionally provides transportation services to URA, an unrelated domestic corporation, URA accounts for only 10% of the gross revenues of FSub, and the remaining 90% of FSub's gross revenues are attributable to FSub's transactions with USP. In determining the degree of comparability between FSub's uncontrolled transaction with URA and its controlled transaction with USP, the difference in volumes involved in the two transactions and the regularity with which these services are provided must be taken into account if such difference would have a material effect on the price charged. Inability to make reliable adjustments for these differences would affect the reliability of the results derived from the uncontrolled transaction as a measure of the arm's length result.

(i) FS manufactures product XX and sells that product to its parent corporation, P. FS also sells product XX to uncontrolled taxpayers at a price of $100 per unit. Except for the volume of each transaction, the sales to P and to uncontrolled taxpayers take place under substantially the same economic conditions and contractual terms. In uncontrolled transactions, FS offers a 2% discount for quantities of 20 per order, and a 5% discount for quantities of 100 per order. If P purchases product XX in quantities of 60 per order, in the absence of other reliable information, it may reasonably be concluded that the arm's length price to P would be $100, less a discount of 3.5%.

(ii) If P purchases product XX in quantities of 1,000 per order, a reliable estimate of the appropriate volume discount must be based on proper economic or statistical analysis, not necessarily a linear extrapolation from the 2% and 5% catalog discounts applicable to sales of 20 and 100 units, respectively.

(i) FP, a foreign producer of wristwatches, is the registered holder of the YY trademark in the United States and in other countries worldwide. In year 1, FP enters the United States market by selling YY wristwatches to its newly organized United States subsidiary, USSub, for distribution in the United States market. USSub pays FP a fixed price per wristwatch. USSub and FP undertake, without separate compensation, marketing activities to establish the YY trademark in the United States market. Unrelated foreign producers of trademarked wristwatches and their authorized United States distributors respectively undertake similar marketing activities in independent arrangements involving distribution of trademarked wristwatches in the United States market. In years 1 through 6, USSub markets and sells YY wristwatches in the United States. Further, in years 1 through 6, USSub undertakes incremental marketing activities in addition to the activities similar to those observed in the independent distribution transactions in the United States market. FP does not directly or indirectly compensate USSub for performing these incremental activities during years 1 through 6. Assume that, aside from these incremental activities, and after any adjustments are made to improve the reliability of the comparison, the price paid per wristwatch by the independent, authorized distributors of wristwatches would provide the most reliable measure of the arm's length price paid per YY wristwatch by USSub.

(ii) By year 7, the wristwatches with the YY trademark generate a premium return in the United States market, as compared to wristwatches marketed by the independent distributors. In year 7, substantially all the premium return from the YY trademark in the United States market is attributed to FP, for example through an increase in the price paid per watch by USSub, or by some other means.

(iii) In determining whether an allocation of income is appropriate in year 7, the Commissioner may consider the economic substance of the arrangements between USSub and FP, and the parties' course of conduct throughout their relationship. Based on this analysis, the Commissioner determines that it is unlikely that, ex ante, an uncontrolled taxpayer operating at arm's length would engage in the incremental marketing activities to develop or enhance intangible property owned by another party unless it received contemporaneous compensation or otherwise had a reasonable anticipation of receiving a future benefit from those activities. In this case, USSub's undertaking the incremental marketing activities in years 1 through 6 is a course of conduct that is inconsistent with the parties' attribution to FP in year 7 of substantially all the premium return from the enhanced YY trademark in the United States market. Therefore, the Commissioner may impute one or more agreements between USSub and FP, consistent with the economic substance of their course of conduct, which would afford USSub an appropriate portion of the premium return from the YY trademark wristwatches. For example, the Commissioner may impute a separate services agreement that affords USSub contingent-payment compensation for its incremental marketing activities in years 1 through 6, which benefited FP by contributing to the value of the trademark owned by FP. In the alternative, the Commissioner may impute a long-term, exclusive agreement to exploit the YY trademark in the United States that allows USSub to benefit from the incremental marketing activities it performed. As another alternative, the Commissioner may require FP to compensate USSub for terminating USSub's imputed long-term, exclusive agreement to exploit the YY trademark in the United States, an agreement that USSub made more valuable at its own expense and risk. The taxpayer may present additional facts that could indicate which of these or other alternative agreements best reflects the economic substance of the underlying transactions, consistent with the parties' course of conduct in the particular case.

(i) FP, a foreign producer of athletic gear, is the registered holder of the AA trademark in the United States and in other countries worldwide. In year 1, FP enters into a licensing agreement that affords its newly organized United States subsidiary, USSub, exclusive rights to certain manufacturing and marketing intangible property (including the AA trademark) for purposes of manufacturing and marketing athletic gear in the United States under the AA trademark. The contractual terms of this agreement obligate USSub to pay FP a royalty based on sales, and also obligate both FP and USSub to undertake without separate compensation specified types and levels of marketing activities. Unrelated foreign businesses license independent United States businesses to manufacture and market athletic gear in the United States, using trademarks owned by the unrelated foreign businesses. The contractual terms of these uncontrolled transactions require the licensees to pay royalties based on sales of the merchandise, and obligate the licensors and licensees to undertake without separate compensation specified types and levels of marketing activities. In years 1 through 6, USSub manufactures and sells athletic gear under the AA trademark in the United States. Assume that, after adjustments are made to improve the reliability of the comparison for any material differences relating to marketing activities, manufacturing or marketing intangible property, and other comparability factors, the royalties paid by independent licensees would provide the most reliable measure of the arm's length royalty owed by USSub to FP, apart from the additional facts in paragraph (ii) of this Example 4.

(ii) In years 1 through 6, USSub performs incremental marketing activities with respect to the AA trademark athletic gear, in addition to the activities required under the terms of the license agreement with FP, that are also incremental as compared to those observed in the comparables. FP does not directly or indirectly compensate USSub for performing these incremental activities during years 1 through 6. By year 7, AA trademark athletic gear generates a premium return in the United States, as compared to similar athletic gear marketed by independent licensees. In year 7, USSub and FP enter into a separate services agreement under which FP agrees to compensate USSub on a cost basis for the incremental marketing activities that USSub performed during years 1 through 6, and to compensate USSub on a cost basis for any incremental marketing activities it may perform in year 7 and subsequent years. In addition, the parties revise the license agreement executed in year 1, and increase the royalty to a level that attributes to FP substantially all the premium return from sales of the AA trademark athletic gear in the United States.

(iii) In determining whether an allocation of income is appropriate in year 7, the Commissioner may consider the economic substance of the arrangements between USSub and FP and the parties' course of conduct throughout their relationship. Based on this analysis, the Commissioner determines that it is unlikely that, ex ante, an uncontrolled taxpayer operating at arm's length would engage in the incremental marketing activities to develop or enhance intangible property owned by another party unless it received contemporaneous compensation or otherwise had a reasonable anticipation of a future benefit. In this case, USSub's undertaking the incremental marketing activities in years 1 through 6 is a course of conduct that is inconsistent with the parties' adoption in year 7 of contractual terms by which FP compensates USSub on a cost basis for the incremental marketing activities that it performed. Therefore, the Commissioner may impute one or more agreements between USSub and FP, consistent with the economic substance of their course of conduct, which would afford USSub an appropriate portion of the premium return from the AA trademark athletic gear. For example, the Commissioner may impute a separate services agreement that affords USSub contingent-payment compensation for the incremental activities it performed during years 1 through 6, which benefited FP by contributing to the value of the trademark owned by FP. In the alternative, the Commissioner may impute a long-term, exclusive United States license agreement that allows USSub to benefit from the incremental activities. As another alternative, the Commissioner may require FP to compensate USSub for terminating USSub's imputed long-term United States license agreement, a license that USSub made more valuable at its own expense and risk. The taxpayer may present additional facts that could indicate which of these or other alternative agreements best reflects the economic substance of the underlying transactions, consistent with the parties' course of conduct in this particular case.

(i) The facts are the same as in paragraph (i) of Example 4. As in Example 4, assume that, after adjustments are made to improve the reliability of the comparison for any material differences relating to marketing activities, manufacturing or marketing intangible property, and other comparability factors, the royalties paid by independent licensees would provide the most reliable measure of the arm's length royalty owed by USSub to FP, apart from the additional facts described in paragraph (ii) of this Example 5.

(ii) In years 1 through 4, USSub performs certain incremental marketing activities with respect to the AA trademark athletic gear, in addition to the activities required under the terms of the basic license agreement, that are also incremental as compared with those activities observed in the comparables. At the start of year 1, FP enters into a separate services agreement with USSub, which states that FP will compensate USSub quarterly, in an amount equal to specified costs plus X%, for these incremental marketing functions. Further, these written agreements reflect the intent of the parties that USSub receive such compensation from FP throughout the term of the agreement, without regard to the success or failure of the promotional activities. During years 1 through 4, USSub performs marketing activities pursuant to the separate services agreement and in each year USSub receives the specified compensation from FP on a cost of services plus basis.

(iii) In evaluating year 4, the Commissioner performs an analysis of independent parties that perform promotional activities comparable to those performed by USSub and that receive separately-stated compensation on a current basis without contingency. The Commissioner determines that the magnitude of the specified cost plus X% is outside the arm's length range in each of years 1 through 4. Based on an evaluation of all the facts and circumstances, the Commissioner makes an allocation to require payment of compensation to USSub for the promotional activities performed in year 4, based on the median of the interquartile range of the arm's length markups charged by the uncontrolled comparables described in paragraph (e)(3) of this section.

(iv) Given that based on facts and circumstances, the terms agreed by the controlled parties were that FP would bear all risks associated with the promotional activities performed by USSub to promote the AA trademark product in the United States market, and given that the parties' conduct during the years examined was consistent with this allocation of risk, the fact that the cost of services plus markup on USSub's services was outside the arm's length range does not, without more, support imputation of additional contractual terms based on alternative views of the economic substance of the transaction, such as terms indicating that USSub, rather than FP, bore the risk associated with these activities.

(i) Company X is a member of a controlled group that has been in operation in the pharmaceutical sector for many years. In years 1 through 4, Company X undertakes research and development activities. As a result of those activities, Company X developed a compound that may be more effective than existing medications in the treatment of certain conditions.

(ii) Company Y is acquired in year 4 by the controlled group that includes Company X. Once Company Y is acquired, Company X makes available to Company Y a large amount of technical data concerning the new compound, which Company Y uses to register patent rights with respect to the compound in several jurisdictions, making Company Y the legal owner of such patents. Company Y then enters into licensing agreements with group members that afford Company Y 100% of the premium return attributable to use of the intangible property by its subsidiaries.

(iii) In determining whether an allocation is appropriate in year 4, the Commissioner may consider the economic substance of the arrangements between Company X and Company Y, and the parties' course of conduct throughout their relationship. Based on this analysis, the Commissioner determines that it is unlikely that an uncontrolled taxpayer operating at arm's length would make available the results of its research and development or perform services that resulted in transfer of valuable know how to another party unless it received contemporaneous compensation or otherwise had a reasonable anticipation of receiving a future benefit from those activities. In this case, Company X's undertaking the research and development activities and then providing technical data and know-how to Company Y in year 4 is inconsistent with the registration and subsequent exploitation of the patent by Company Y. Therefore, the Commissioner may impute one or more agreements between Company X and Company Y consistent with the economic substance of their course of conduct, which would afford Company X an appropriate portion of the premium return from the patent rights. For example, the Commissioner may impute a separate services agreement that affords Company X contingent-payment compensation for its services in year 4 for the benefit of Company Y, consisting of making available to Company Y technical data, know-how, and other fruits of research and development conducted in previous years. These services benefited Company Y by giving rise to and contributing to the value of the patent rights that were ultimately registered by Company Y. In the alternative, the Commissioner may impute a transfer of patentable intangible property rights from Company X to Company Y immediately preceding the registration of patent rights by Company Y. The taxpayer may present additional facts that could indicate which of these or other alternative agreements best reflects the economic substance of the underlying transactions, consistent with the parties' course of conduct in the particular case.

FD, the wholly-owned foreign distributor of USM, a U.S. manufacturer, buys widgets from USM under a written contract. Widgets are a generic electronic appliance. Under the terms of the contract, FD must buy and take title to 20,000 widgets for each of the five years of the contract at a price of $10 per widget. The widgets will be sold under FD's label, and FD must finance any marketing strategies to promote sales in the foreign market. There are no rebate or buy back provisions. FD has adequate financial capacity to fund its obligations under the contract under any circumstances that could reasonably be expected to arise. In Years 1, 2 and 3, FD sold only 10,000 widgets at a price of $11 per unit. In Year 4, FD sold its entire inventory of widgets at a price of $25 per unit. Since the contractual terms allocating market risk were agreed to before the outcome of such risk was known or reasonably knowable, FD had the financial capacity to bear the market risk that it would be unable to sell all of the widgets it purchased currently, and its conduct was consistent over time, FD will be deemed to bear the risk.

The facts are the same as in Example 1, except that in Year 1 FD had only $100,000 in total capital, including loans. In subsequent years USM makes no additional contributions to the capital of FD, and FD is unable to obtain any capital through loans from an unrelated party. Nonetheless, USM continues to sell 20,000 widgets annually to FD under the terms of the contract, and USM extends credit to FD to enable it to finance the purchase. FD does not have the financial capacity in Years 1, 2 and 3 to finance the purchase of the widgets given that it could not sell most of the widgets it purchased during those years. Thus, notwithstanding the terms of the contract, USM and not FD assumed the market risk that a substantial portion of the widgets could not be sold, since in that event FD would not be able to pay USM for all of the widgets it purchased.

S, a Country X corporation, manufactures small motors that it sells to P, its U.S. parent. P incorporates the motors into various products and sells those products to uncontrolled customers in the United States. The contract price for the motors is expressed in U.S. dollars, effectively allocating the currency risk for these transactions to S for any currency fluctuations between the time the contract is signed and payment is made. As long as S has adequate financial capacity to bear this currency risk (including by hedging all or part of the risk) and the conduct of S and P is consistent with the terms of the contract (i.e., the contract price is not adjusted to reflect exchange rate movements), the agreement of the parties to allocate the exchange risk to S will be respected.

USSub is the wholly-owned U.S. subsidiary of FP, a foreign manufacturer. USSub acts as a distributor of goods manufactured by FP. FP and USSub execute an agreement providing that FP will bear any ordinary product liability costs arising from defects in the goods manufactured by FP. In practice, however, when ordinary product liability claims are sustained against USSub and FP, USSub pays the resulting damages. Therefore, the district director disregards the contractual arrangement regarding product liability costs between FP and USSub, and treats the risk as having been assumed by USSub.

Manuco, a wholly-owned foreign subsidiary of P, a U.S. corporation, manufactures products in Country Z for sale to P. No uncontrolled transactions are located that would provide a reliable measure of the arm's length result under the comparable uncontrolled price method. The district director considers applying the cost plus method or the comparable profits method. Information on uncontrolled taxpayers performing comparable functions under comparable circumstances in the same geographic market is not available. Therefore, adjusted data from uncontrolled manufacturers in other markets may be considered in order to apply the cost plus method. In this case, comparable uncontrolled manufacturers are found in the United States. Accordingly, data from the comparable U.S. uncontrolled manufacturers, as adjusted to account for differences between the United States and Country Z's geographic market, is used to test the arm's length price paid by P to Manuco. However, the use of such data may affect the reliability of the results for purposes of the best method rule. See § 1.482-1(c).

Couture, a U.S. apparel design corporation, contracts with Sewco, its wholly owned Country Y subsidiary, to manufacture its clothes. Costs of operating in Country Y are significantly lower than the operating costs in the United States. Although clothes with the Couture label sell for a premium price, the actual production of the clothes does not require significant specialized knowledge that could not be acquired by actual or potential competitors to Sewco at reasonable cost. Thus, Sewco's functions could be performed by several actual or potential competitors to Sewco in geographic markets that are similar to Country Y. Thus, the fact that production is less costly in Country Y will not, in and of itself, justify additional profits derived from lower operating costs in Country Y inuring to Sewco, because the competitive positions of the other actual or potential producers in similar geographic markets capable of performing the same functions at the same low costs indicate that at arm's length such profits would not be retained by Sewco.

USP, a United States manufacturer of computer software, sells its products to FSub, its foreign distributor in country X. Compco, a United States competitor of USP, also sells its products in X through unrelated distributors. However, in the year under review, Compco is forced into bankruptcy, and Compco liquidates its inventory by selling all of its products to unrelated distributors in X for a liquidation price. Because the sale of its entire inventory was not a sale in the ordinary course of business, Compco's sale cannot be used as an uncontrolled comparable to determine USP's arm's length result from its controlled transaction.

USP, a United States manufacturer of farm machinery, sells its products to FSub, its wholly-owned distributor in Country Y. USP, operating at nearly full capacity, sells 95% of its inventory to FSub. To make use of its excess capacity, and also to establish a comparable uncontrolled price for its transfer price to FSub, USP increases its production to full capacity. USP sells its excess inventory to Compco, an unrelated foreign distributor in Country X. Country X has approximately the same economic conditions as that of Country Y. Because one of the principal purposes of selling to Compco was to establish an arm's length price for its controlled transactions with FSub, USP's sale to Compco cannot be used as an uncontrolled comparable to determine USP's arm's length result from its controlled transaction.

USSub is a U.S. subsidiary of FP, a foreign corporation. Parent manufactures product X and sells it to USSub. USSub functions as a distributor of product X to unrelated customers in the United States. The fact that FP may incur a loss on the manufacture and sale of product X does not by itself establish that USSub, dealing with FP at arm's length, also would incur a loss. An independent distributor acting at arm's length with its supplier would in many circumstances be expected to earn a profit without regard to the level of profit earned by the supplier.

(i) In Year 1 USP, a United States corporation, bought 100 shares of UR, an unrelated corporation, for $100,000. In Year 2, when the value of the UR stock had decreased to $40,000, USP contributed all 100 shares of UR stock to its wholly-owned subsidiary in exchange for subsidiary's capital stock. In Year 3, the subsidiary sold all of the UR stock for $40,000 to an unrelated buyer, and on its U.S. income tax return, claimed a loss of $60,000 attributable to the sale of the UR stock. USP and its subsidiary do not file a consolidated return.

(ii) In determining the true taxable income of the subsidiary, the district director may disallow the loss of $60,000 on the ground that the loss was incurred by USP. National Securities Corp. v Commissioner, 137 F.2d 600 (3rd Cir. 1943), cert. denied, 320 U.S. 794 (1943).

P sold product Z to S for $60 per unit in 1995. Applying the resale price method to data from uncontrolled comparables for the same year establishes an arm's length range of prices for the controlled transaction from $52 to $59 per unit. Since the price charged in the controlled transaction falls outside the range, the district director would ordinarily make an allocation under section 482. However, in this case there are cyclical factors that affect the results of the uncontrolled comparables (and that of the controlled transaction) that cannot be adequately accounted for by specific adjustments to the data for 1995. Therefore, the district director considers results over multiple years to account for these factors. Under these circumstances, it is appropriate to average the results of the uncontrolled comparables over the years 1993, 1994, and 1995 to determine an arm's length range. The averaged results establish an arm's length range of $56 to $58 per unit. For consistency, the results of the controlled taxpayers must also be averaged over the same years. The average price in the controlled transaction over the three years is $57. Because the controlled transfer price of product Z falls within the arm's length range, the district director makes no allocation.

(i) FP, a Country X corporation, designs and manufactures machinery in Country X. FP's costs are incurred in Country X currency. USSub is the exclusive distributor of FP's machinery in the United States. The price of the machinery sold by FP to USSub is expressed in Country X currency. Thus, USSub bears all of the currency risk associated with fluctuations in the exchange rate between the time the contract is signed and the payment is made. The prices charged by FP to USSub for 1995 are under examination. In that year, the value of the dollar depreciated against the currency of Country X, and as a result, USSub's gross margin was only 8%.

(ii) UD is an uncontrolled distributor of similar machinery that performs distribution functions substantially the same as those performed by USSub, except that UD purchases and resells machinery in transactions where both the purchase and resale prices are denominated in U.S. dollars. Thus, UD had no currency exchange risk. UD's gross margin in 1995 was 10%. UD's average gross margin for the period 1990 to 1998 has been 12%.

(iii) In determining whether the price charged by FP to USSub in 1995 was arm's length, the district director may consider USSub's average gross margin for an appropriate period before and after 1995 to determine whether USSub's average gross margin during the period was sufficiently greater than UD's average gross margin during the same period such that USSub was sufficiently compensated for the currency risk it bore throughout the period. See § 1.482- 1(d)(3)(iii) (Risk).

FP manufactures product X in Country M and sells it to USSub, which distributes X in the United States. USSub realizes losses with respect to the controlled transactions in each of five consecutive taxable years. In each of the five consecutive years a different uncontrolled comparable realized a loss with respect to comparable transactions equal to or greater than USSub's loss. Pursuant to paragraph (f)(3)(iii)(C) of this section, the district director examines whether the uncontrolled comparables realized similar losses over a comparable period of time, and finds that each of the five comparables realized losses in only one of the five years, and their average result over the five-year period was a profit. Based on this data, the district director may conclude that the controlled taxpayer's results are not within the arm's length range over the five year period, since the economic conditions that resulted in the controlled taxpayer's loss did not have a comparable effect over a comparable period of time on the uncontrolled comparables.

(i) USP, a U.S. corporation, manufactures product Y in the United States and sells it to FSub, which acts as USP's exclusive distributor of product Y in Country N. The resale price method described in § 1.482-3(c) is used to evaluate whether the transfer price charged by USP to FSub for the 1994 taxable year for product Y was arm's length. For the period 1992 through 1994, FSub had a gross profit margin for each year of 13%. A, B, C and D are uncontrolled distributors of products that compete directly with product Y in country N. After making appropriate adjustments in accordance with §§ 1.482-1(d)(2) and 1.482-3(c), the gross profit margins for A, B, C, and D are as follows:

(ii) Applying the provisions of § 1.482-1(e), the district director determines that the arm's length range of the average gross profit margins is between 7.33 and 8.67. The district director concludes that FSub's average gross margin of 13% is not within the arm's length range, despite the fact that C's gross profit margin for 1994 was also 13%, since the economic conditions that caused S's result did not have a comparable effect over a comparable period of time on the results of C or the other uncontrolled comparables. In this case, the district director makes an allocation equivalent to adjusting FSub's gross profit margin for 1994 from 13% to the mean of the uncontrolled comparables' results for 1994 (7.25%).

(i) FS is a foreign subsidiary of P, a U.S. corporation. P manufactures and sells household appliances. FS operates as P's exclusive distributor in Europe. P annually establishes the price for each of its appliances sold to FS as part of its annual budgeting, production allocation and scheduling, and performance evaluation processes. FS's aggregate gross margin earned in its distribution business is 18%.

(ii) ED is an uncontrolled European distributor of competing household appliances. After adjusting for minor differences in the level of inventory, volume of sales, and warranty programs conducted by FS and ED, ED's aggregate gross margin is also 18%. Thus, the district director may conclude that the aggregate prices charged by P for its appliances sold to FS are arm's length, without determining whether the budgeting, production, and performance evaluation processes of P are similar to such processes used by ED.